Chapter-12
Railway safety
Safety-It defines solicitude of the Railway to conservation of life and property with a slew of regulation, management and technological advancement in respect of all the elements of rail transportation.
Accident- A rail accident is a gratuitous happening with damaging consequences. It is unintended and unwelcome. Nevertheless it occurs due to human frailty, misjudgment or vulnerability of equipment. In railway parlance accident is a comprehensive word and includes occurrences like collision, derailment, level crossing mishap, breach of block rules etc. Even the averted accident (crossing signal at danger, averted collision) as different from consequential accidents are regarded as accidents. Collision is most serious type of accident because it inflicts great injury, loss of lives and destruction of railway assets apart from tarnishing the image of the Railway. Human failure is the major cause for such a disaster. Accident Relief Trains (ART) and Accident Relief Medical Equipment (ARME) are provided at the important stations for rescue, relief and restoration operations.
The train driver is the critical factor whose forgetfulness can be fatal. The following safeguards have been provided to enable the driver to be more receptive and responsive to the signals:
The signals are so positioned and oriented that the red aspect is more striking to the driver’s eyes.
A danger signal is always preceded by a warning signal.
Signals are designed for fail-safe condition. If a signal fails it goes to ON (danger) position.
Drooping (half lowered) signal and signals with extinguished lights are all treated as at danger.
The driver during run of the train has to constantly call the aspect of the signal the train is approaching, which the co-driver repeats. This ensures all time alertness.
Officers and Inspectors of various departments regularly conduct footplate inspection by travelling in the driver’s cab. Apart from noticing locations of rough riding they check up the visibility of signals and alertness of the crew. If the driver wears spects he has to produce a spare set when asked to show.
The crew while reporting for duty have to pass through breathalyzer test to ensure that he is not under the influence of intoxicants.
Thus, a train driver who first sights a signal is equipped with wherewithal to stop the train on perception of danger. In fact, he stands the greatest risk of his own life in consequence of passing signal at danger. It is natural for him to show utmost respect to the signals. Yet accidents sometimes occur due to disregard of the signals. The failure of the human element is inexplicable. On rare occasions it is fleeting forgetfulness. But some of the saddest cases are those where a conscientious driver makes an honest mistake. Sometimes we will never definitely know what was the real causes of the accident.
To avert the disastrous consequence of train passing signal at danger Automatic Warning System has been devised. For sections and the locomotives running thereon ,equipped with such a device the driver gets an audible warning and visual reminder that he is approaching a signal at caution aspect or a stretch with speed restriction. The driver is expected to acknowledge it within a set time . If he disregards the warning given the brakes are applied. One Divisional Mechanical Engineer confided in me that he has got the driver’s seat in diesel locomotives tampered in such a manner that for it to remain horizontal the driver must seat in an erect posture. Should he doze the seat becomes tilted and he slips off from the seat. He said that it had worked.
Trespassing- Tracks belong to the trains. Cases of pedestrians knocked down by the train is not an accident. On the other hand, trespassing on the railway track constitutes offence under the Indian Railway Act which entails punishment with imprisonment for a term upto 6 months and/or a fine of Rs 1,000. Even no insurance claim can be made for deaths resulting from illegal crossing of track. Fear inducing images can inject some fear. The Western railway has introduced awareness campaign amongst people about the danger of crossing the railway track by posting personnel costumed as ‘Yamraj’ to provide safety information to the people and intervene, if necessary, to stop them from walking on the track.
I UP Howrah-Delhi Kalka mail was stopped at Home signal of Gaya on operational consideration. After waiting for sometimes the train started and derailed taking no-road. It can happen only when the point is in the process of being reversed while a train is approaching it. The points are so interlocked with signals that it is only after its firm setting and locking that the corresponding signal can be taken OFF (proceed). In the reverse process it is only after putting the corresponding signal to ON (danger) position that the lock can be released, and the point setting changed. Only experienced and smart drivers were allowed to man Kalka Mail. It was, therefore, unlikely that after obeying the signal the driver would have disregarded it and started the train without any authority. The operating staff, however, contended that the driver had moved of his own while the signal was red and the point was under process of setting. The enquiry committee had dissent notes and the matter was resolved at the highest level.
The engineering department is entrusted with safety of track. Their own routine inspections are supplemented by the output from track recording devices which are periodically run to detect unsafe condition in the track, if any. In the initial stage track defects were recorded mechanically by Hallade track recorder. Then came Electrical Track Recording Car (TRC) which recorded principal track parameters. With advancement in track technology electronic Track-Recording-cum-Research Car (TRRC) appeared on the scene. There were also Oscillograph cars to record horizontal and vertical accelerations. These devices were of great value to the Permanent way engineers in planning track maintenance. Rail fracture, which takes place due to incorrect maintenance of the expansion gaps, is a matter of concern for the engineers. Providing and maintaining correct expansion gap was a simple affair when ordinary rails of 13 metres length and Short Welded Rails (SWR) of 39 metres length were in use. But with introduction of Long Welded Rails (LWR) of one km length and Continuous Welded Rails (CWR) of any length, maintenance of correct expansion gap to cater for the two extremes of temperature is an onerous task. It enjoins destressing of the LWRs and CWRs once in a year during cold months. This is beset with difficulty as it requires blocking of the line and stopping train movement on it for a few hours. Rail fracture is also attributable to flawed rails. Such an exigency is taken care of by subjecting all the rails to examination by the Ultrasonic Rail Flaw Detector (USFD) prior to welding and even in service.
It is intriguing that rail fractures normally occur somewhere near 02.00 hours in the night and detected by the keyman not before 08.00 hours in the morning. During the intervening period of about 6 hours a number of trains would have passed over the fractured rail with impunity.
Level crossing accident-- A level crossing is level intersection of a railway track and a road or a pathway.
A level crossing may be guarded by a personnel when it is called a manned. The cautionary road sign for the road users on the approach of manned level crossings is a pair of horizontal bars crossed perpendicularly by a series of upward pointing vertical bars . A number of these level crossings are protected by signals. The interlocking is such that the signals cannot be taken OFF unless the gates are closed to the road users. Some are provided with telephones. At such level crossings protected by signals or not, provided with telephone or not the gatekeeper has to anticipate trains and close the gates in time. But he may have to incur the wrath of the road users if he is extra cautious. There are still about 18000 such level crossings on the Indian railways. These are proposed to be eliminated systematically by construction of roadoverbridge on cost-sharing basis with the state government, low height underpass wherever technically feasible and suitable merger & diversion of roads
The other category is unmanned level crossing which remains unguarded. Appropriate cautionary sign is a steam engine and a legend ‘Stop, lookout for trains before crossing’ as also a sign of speed breaker. Accidents at such level crossings are completely avoidable provided the road user is aware of his responsibility to stop the vehicle short of the level crossing and enter it only after his assistant has walked to the gate and ensured that there is no train in sight. A road vehicle stands no chance against a train and the latter must have the right of way. Such level crossings were big safety constraints both for the rail and road users. Acting in a mission mode the Indian Railways have eliminated all the unmanned level crossings from the Broad gauge routes. A little above a thousand reportedly still exist on Metre & Narrow gauge routes which will be eliminated, wherever feasible, during gauge conversion projects.
Level crossings on the French Railways are provided with a sign ‘Un train peut en cacher un autre’ meaning ‘a train can hide another train’.
Some popular safety slogans:
(i)Sawdhani hati, durghatna ghati. (The slip of a moment and a disaster)
(ii) Stop at RED, go at GREEN, do not rush in between
(iii)Only duffers get in between buffers, They suffer also


Safety seminars-- these are held periodically. As Additional divisional railway manager/Howrah I was attending a safety seminar. The drivers regaled the participants with their tale of woes.
Said one- My train was stopped on a red signal on approach of Howrah yard. After waiting for sometimes the passengers asked me to blow whistle. I explained to them that the train was too far from the RRI cabin and the sound of whistle would not reach the cabin. I further added that the cabin was aware of our waiting train'. But they still insisted. Seeing no way out I reluctantly whistled. It so happened that by coincidence the signal was taken OFF. Then the passengers rebuked me saying ‘Had you heeded to our advice you would have saved our precious time’.
Said another- My train stopped at a danger signal. After waiting for a few minutes, the passengers asked me to disregard it and proceed.
I said ‘I cannot. Red signal is inviolate. Ignoring it may invite accident'
Passengers- ‘But we have seen you crossing red signal'
The driver- 'but that was an automatic signal which can be crossed in red aspect observing certain rules. But this signal is a block signal and cannot be crossed under any circumstances.'
Passengers-' We do not know all these subtle differences. Do as we say'.
The Driver said that he was in a fix and could do nothing except to prolong the argument and gain time. While these disputes went on the signal was taken OFF much to my relief.'
Accident Relief Train (ART) and Accident Relief Medical Equipment (ARME)- They are stationed at important stations. A locomotive always remains attached to them. On being informed about an accident by the control room sirens provided in the loco sheds are blown. One long followed by 4 short whistles imply main line train accident involving passenger train. The respective control informs its officers & inspectors and note down their response. Those days the cell phones were not in vogue and we had to depend on railway phones. When we went to see a picture the trolley men or the engineering control were informed of the name of the picture hall so that we can be pulled out in the midst of show in the exigency of the situation. On hearing the siren, the officials would rush to the ART which will depart for the accident site within 45 minutes.
The Accident site—The Officers and Inspectors reaching the site seize the documents related to train operation , note down the features of the levers, block instrument and signals. They ensure that the evidences are not tampered with. A telephone would be installed at the site manned by a staff of S & T department for communicating with the control room and further to the headquarters. Naturally after track protection the first emphasis is on rescue and first aid to the passengers. Depending on the requirement of the situation men and materials are rushed from the adjacent Divisions, even from adjacent railways. Under the instructions & guidance of senior officers the staff work round the clock till the track is restored. A forecast about probable time of restoration is required to be given to the headquarters so that the train services can be suitably regulated. It is not an easy job as the whole area is in a complete mess with derailed vehicles mutually entangled and pitted against each other in all conceivable position, twisted and bent rails, broken OHE (overhead electric equipment) masts, dislocated overhead electric wires etc. In one accident the senior site officer was frequently called on the site phone by the headquarters official to give a forecast of time of restoration. Fed up he said ‘forecast for giving forecast is 2 hours’. Civil and police officials invariably join the rescue operation in case passenger trains are involved. They become alert if the clues point out to possible sabotage. Sketches are prepared by the engineers showing the position of the vehicles (both derailed & intact), point of mount & point of drop of the wheels, broken fittings and foreign objects. In case of derailment suggestive of sabotage the engineers should check up if any tool-box has been tampered with and inform the civil authorities & police accordingly. The staff of mechanical engineering department use the word ‘hafiz’ to imply ‘raise the crane jib’ and ‘ariya to imply ‘lower the crane jib’. To ward off erroneous reporting by unscrupulous media persons official statements thoughtfully prepared are issued from time to time by the railway spokesman. Free food or cash in lieu thereof is made available to the staff engaged in the restoration work. For this purpose the officers are allowed to draw cash from station earning.
Departmental enquiry—In serious accident where the CRS is not in a position to enquire and for all other accidents-whether consequential or indicative ,a fact-finding enquiry by a committee of officers from the division or headquarters ( SAG officers for collisions to Sr Supervisors for yard accidents ) follows to find out the cause of the accident ,formulate proposals to prevent its recurrence & fix responsibility. The same is accepted by the GM/DRM/Sr DSO. A time-schedule has been laid down for convening the enquiry (D+3) to its finalization (D +15) as also for completion of the DAR against the responsible official (D+90).
The plea that “the coach/wagon has travelled over hundreds of kms safely, why should it derail here?’ or “thousands of coaches/wagons have passed over this spot safely why should this particular one derail here?” do not hold any water. Apart from measurements at the accident site some times wheel profile of the suspect rolling stock is prepared with moulds for a detailed analysis. The dynamics of rail-wheel interaction is so intricate that a definite cause of accident many a times remain under dispute between civil engineers and mechanical engineers. While track parameters are few and easily understandable the parameters of wagons, coaches and locomotives are manifold. A smart civil engineer is expected to know them well. Investigation of derailment is a regular subject of our training.
Commissioner Of Railway safety (CRS) enquiry--A statutory inquiry by him is obligatory in every accident involving a passenger-carrying train, which is attended with loss of human life or with grievous injury to passengers in the train or with large loss of railway property . He is an officer of the Indian Railway Service of Engineers who has opted for service in the Ministry of Tourism and Civil aviation. His other jobs include sanctioning opening of new lines, electrification, introduction of new rolling stock and even approving schemes for rebuilding of bridges etc.
In the year of my superannuation in 1997 Howrah-New Delhi Rajdhani Express had derailed at Muthani in Gaya-Mughalsarai section. There was no casualty. The cause was found to be sabotage. I was happy to see that it was my batchmate (Sri A.P.Agarwala), then CRS /North Eastern Circle, who conducted the enquiry. He was convinced about the cause despite half hearted opposition from the Civil and Police officials of the State Government.
Some notable train disasters
Bihta accident (17th july 1937)--The tragic derailment of the down Punjab Mail, (6 down) on the East Indian Railway in the early hours of 17th July at Bihta, has been a talking point for decades after its occurrence. XB Pacific class steam locomotive, which was a very rough rider at high speeds because of excessive oscillations, was blamed for the accident. The train had stopped at Arrah and its next stop was to have been Danapore Cantonment, but as Bihta was about fifteen miles from Arrah, the train had plenty of time to pick up speed and must have been doing about sixty miles per hour, when it went off the rails, resulting in loss of over 100 lives. What is intriguing, however, that the same locomotive during its 40 miles non-stop run between Buxar and Arrah must have picked up this speed with impunity.
Dumaraon accident (21st July 1962)- There was head-on-collision between 6 Down (Amritsar-Howrah Mail) and 1267 Up Small Quick Transit (SQT) goods train at Dumaraon station. The SQT was received from Twininganj on the Up Main line and then shunted on the Down Main line. Due to human error the cabinman granted permission to the 6 Down to approach on the Down Main line. It was night hours and the 6 Down ,scheduled to run through, was approaching the station at the sped of about 52 miles per hour. By the time the driver of the 6 Down realized the presence of the SQT on the same line it was too late. The consequential head-on-collision resulted in loss of 74 lives and injury to 55 persons. Track-circuiting could have avoided such a disaster. But it was still in process of installation at stations. If Dumaraon were covered by this time the cabinman could not have taken OFF the signal for admitting the train on the occupied line.
Dhanushkodi accident (23.12.1964)--Train number 653 (Pamban-Dhanushkodi passenger) left Pamban junction close to midnight of 22nd December. The town of Dhanushkodi had already been struck by cyclone and ravaged by storm surge. The wind velocity was 280 kmph when the 6-coach train was nearing Dhanushkodi railway station. The following account seems to have been speculative since there was no survivor of 110 passengers and 5 railwaymen on-board. It was pitch darkness around and even after reasonable wait at the signal there was no indication of its being taken OFF for admitting the train to the station. In an extraordinary and unorthodox move the driver blew a long whistle and decided to take a risk. Minutes after he had proceeded ahead, 7m high tidal waves smashed into the train and submerged all the its coaches into deep sea water. The tragedy came to light only after 48 hours when the railway headquarters issued a bulletin based on the information given by the Marine Superintendent, Pamban. Reportedly the tip of the engine was barely visible above water. A couple of coaches may lie deep at the bottom of the Arabian sea. Whatever remained of the rest, scattered at different distances from the alignment of the track ,were recovered over a period and disposed of as scrap. Another aftermath of the cyclone was damage to the Pamban bridge itself situated 28 kms from Dhanushkodi. Fortunately the bridge had not rail traffic on the said night and the ill-fated train was moving away from the bridge.


Badlaghat accident- On 6th of June 1981 a 9-coach passenger train derailed on a bridge between Badlaghat and Dharma ghat on the Mansi-Saharsa section of the N.E.Rly in the thick of heavy rain and storm . As a result 7 rear coaches got separated from the train and plunged into the swollen Bagmati river. Official death toll was reported as 235. There may be cases of some passengers swept away by the current. Multiple theories were woven as to the cause of the accident. According to railway sources it was the consequence of enormous wind pressure exerted on the coaches, whose closed shutters in face of continuous downpour and strong storm, prevented the gall to cross over. Other theories were “sudden application of brakes by the driver”, “weak bridge” etc. However the findings of the Railway was disputed by the state government. The accident had its political fallout also as it led to spar between the Chief Minister and the Railway Minister. Hundred years ago there was a similar accident on the British Rail as described below:
Tay bridge accident on the British Rail-In the evening of 28th December 1879, during a severe gale, the central navigation spans and their substructures of the first Tay bridge collapsed. In the meantime a North British Railway (NBR) passenger train on Edinburgh-Aberdeen line was proceeding from Wormit on its way to Dundee. The 6-car train had slowed down for collecting token from the signal box (cabin) at the southern end of the bridge. Unaware of the collapse of the bridge ahead of it , the train was proceeding cautiously when it plunged into the swirling icy water of the Firth of Tay. Not one person aboard survived. 75 souls were said to have perished although not all the bodies were ever recovered. It was a lattice girder bridge supported on cast iron trestles with wrought iron bracings. The enquiry committee blamed Sir Thomas Bouch, entrusted with the design & construction of the bridge, for its collapse as he had not made explicit allowance for wind loading in design of the bridge. Had the engineer overreached himself in underestimating the element of lateral wind force on high perch girders? Or was it an exercise in structural design much ahead of time? He might have been excused for misjudging the effects of high wind as there were other engineers also associated with the design. But there was also the allegation of poor quality control and improper supervision during construction phase. It appears Bouch was only censored and spared the agony of penal action. But the disaster goes down into the pages of history of the British Isles as a monumental structural engineering failure. Was arrogant pride caused ruin of the bridge which was Bouch’s design as well as obsession? Or was the Victorian civil engineer made an object of derision to assuage the wronged pride of a British society cultivated on the laurels of Isambard Brunel ,George Stephenson and Robert Stephenson? Bouch whose life and carrier were devastated due to this fiasco would die a shattered soul within a year of the happening? He will be remembered as the hapless civil engineer who authored United Kingdom’s longest (2 miles) rail bridge -only fated to doom less than two years later. The second bridge was built parallel to the original one and opened in 1887 after rigorous tests and trials. The substructure of the old bridge are still visible above the surface of the Tay at low tide and are poignant reminder of the stigma inflicted on the railways in the 50th year of its inception. The steam locomotive ( NBR 224) which had survived the disaster was retrieved from the river bed and repaired. Subsequently it remained in service until 1919.
Triple train accident- On the fateful evening of 2nd June 2023, the passenger train 12841 (Coromandel Express) from Shalimar (Kolkata) to Chennai Central was approaching Bahanaga Bazar station of South Eastern Railway on the UP Main line. The Loco pilot saw the green light at the Distant signal post , about 2 kms from the station and continued at the maximum permissible speed of 130 kmph. Technically the signal aspect should have been yellow as the points were erroneously set for the UP loop line and the train should have been slowed down. The Loco pilot finding even Home signal (located at 180m from the station) displaying green light continued at unabated speed. In consequence of the signalling error the train, instead of continuing on the UP Main line ,was diverted to the UP loop line and crashed into a stationary freight train. Due to this mishap six of the 23 coaches of Coromandel express derailed which crashed into rear end of the 12864 (Yashwantpur-Howrah express) passing through the station on the Down Main line at about 128 kmph , derailing its two coaches. The triple crash left 288 dead and about 1100 injured. Prima facie it was a case of manual interference with the Electronic Interlocking system (EIS) which failed to detect the error and led to diversion of Coromandel express on an occupied line. EIS is 99.9 percent error-free but there is always 0.1 percent chance of error. What is amazing is how there could be manual interference with the system so that it managed to send ‘conflicting orders’. The EIS should have gone to ‘Fail safe mode’ imparting yellow aspect to the distant signal and red aspect to the Home signal. It was a freakish accident. Had Coromandel express running merely 3 seconds late , the last few coaches of the Down train would have passed the impact site unscathed. Such a contrived involvement of Yashwantpur-Howrah express shows the power of destiny. Technology, expertise ,dedication etc can reduce accidents but their total elimination requires blessings of Almighty in addition.
Safety First – Safety receives the topmost priority by the IR. Unremitting measures have been taken to mitigate train accidents and enhance safety. Some of them are described hereunder:
(a) Technological upgradation in safety aspects of locomotives, coaches, wagons and signalling.
(b) Mechanization of track both in the matter of laying and maintenance
(c) Track circuiting at stations to detect occupancy of lines electrically/electronically rather than mechanically.
(d) Installation of Route Relay Interlocking at large & busy stations and Panel Interlocking at other stations for safe & efficient movement of trains and eliminating the need of multi-cabin operation.
(e) Equipping sections with anti-collision device network to prevent head-on, rear-end and side collisions.
(f) Extensive footplate inspections by the officers and the supervisors.
(g) Continuous learning and education/training to upgrade skill and knowledge of the staff so that they can deliver superior and safe service.
Accident Index- The internationally-recognized measure of safety which is “Accidents Per Million Train Kilometres” has registered remarkable improvement during the last 3 decades. The number of “Accidents Per Million Train Kilometres” came down from a high figure of 2.20 in 1981-82 to an all-time low figure of 0.06 in 2018-19. This bears out the determination of the Indian Railways to seek zero-accident mode.